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NOTES AND COMMENTS
STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
GLOBALIZING EFFECTS OF THE
INTERNET: A CASE STUDY OF THE
PRIVACY DEBATE
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of sovereignty long has held center-stage in
the field of international law. Nations define themselves by
their territoriality and fight to protect their sovereign inter-
ests. Within this realm, the Internet has served as a unique
globalizing force.' In doing so, it has broken down traditional,
physical boundaries, and, by extension, dismissed, or at least
substantially modified, traditional views of state sovereignty.2
"Telepower in its various forms-telecommunications, electronic
entertainment, computer and information services, robotics,
artificial intelligence, and expert systems-is already reshaping
the global economy, internationalizing labor, and shifting jobs
in space, time, and concept. Some would argue it is rendering
the nation state obsolete."3 In the modern day, states can rare-
1. See Fred H. Cate, Symposium: Data Protection Law and the European
Union's Directive: The Challenge for the United States: The E.U. Data Protection
Directive, Information Privacy, and the Public Interest, 80 IOWA L. REV. 431, 441-
442 (1995) [hereinafter Cate, Data Protection Law]. See also Fred H. Cate, Sym-
posium: 'Sovereignty and the Globalization of Intellectual Property: Introduction
Sovereignty and the Globalization of Intellectual Property, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1998).
2. PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS 65 (1998)
(Quoting Timothy C. May, signature file end quote for numerous listserve postings
which states, "inlational borders aren't even speed bumps on the information su-
perhighway."). See Fred H. Cate, Symposium: The Globalization of Law, Politics,
And Markets: Implications For Domestic Law Reform, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 467 (1994) [hereinafter Cate, The Globalization of Law]; David R. Johnson
and David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1367 (1996).
3. See Cate, The Globalization of Law, supra note 2, at 467 (quoting Joseph
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ly act domestically without causing significant effects else-
where. In an amplified example of this, nations attempting to
regulate the Internet are faced with the realization that their
regulations have global impact4 and must confront the reality
that their laws may have a direct and significant impact on
other states. Clearly then, regulation of the Internet is often
not limited by territorial borders, and, therefore, risks en-
croaching upon the sovereignty of other states.
The European Union5 Data Protection Directive ["Direc-
tive"] is one example of Internet legislation that has direct and
possibly severe consequences on third-party sovereign na-
tions.' The Directive was passed on October 24, 1995' in an
effort to protect E.U. citizens' fundamental right to privacy.'
The Directive requires all Member States to implement nation-
al legislation to conform with its terms within three years of
its passage.9 While Member States are given a degree of lati-
tude to determine the scope and nature of national law drafted
to conform with the Directive,"° certain essential components
are required. Specifically, the Directive aims to achieve equiva-
lency among Member States to ensure similar, if not uniform,
data protection laws." Furthermore, the Directive requires
Member States to limit the transmission of data only to third
N. Pelton, The Globalization of Universal Telecommunications Services, in ANN.
REV. OF THE INSTIT. FOR INFO. STUDIES, 141, 143 (1991)).
4. See infra examples at p. 8.
5. The European Union is comprised of fifteen Member States including:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Finland, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
6. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to processing of personal
data and on the free movement of such data, O.J. (L 281) Nov. 23, 1995 [hereinaf-
ter Directive]. See infra Section II.A.
7. See Convention for the protection of individuals with regard to automatic
processing of personal data, Jan. 28, 1981, Eur. T.S. No. 108 (1980) [hereinafter
Convention]. See also SWIRE, supra note 2, at 47, stating, "the Directive is de-
signed to protect fundamental human rights to privacy."
8. Directive, supra note 6.
9. A European Union directive requires implementing legislation on behalf of
the Member States. In contrast, a European Union regulation directly governs the
activities of Member States.
10. Directive, supra note 6, art. 5. See infra discussion in Section III.B.
11. For a good discussion of the equivalency of the data protection laws of the
Member States, see Paul M. Schwartz, European Data Protection Law and Restric-
tions on International Data Flows, 80 IOWA L. REV. 471, 474-477 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter European Data Protection Law].
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countries12  who demonstrate adequate data protection.13
While adequacy is not as strict as equivalency,14 it neverthe-
less demands a certain level of acquiescence to European Un-
ion law by third-party countries if they are to continue those
relations with Member States. As a result, the Directive, by re-
quiring third countries to implement adequate data protection,
has encroached upon the sovereignty of these nations.
This note will address the globalizing effects of the
Internet as it relates to the sovereignty of states. The Europe-
an Union Data Protection Directive will be analyzed as a case
study to illustrate the effects of the Internet, and regulation
thereof, upon state sovereignty. The first section briefly dis-
cusses the concept of sovereignty and its role in the interna-
tional realm. Second, the European Union Data Protection
Directive will be explained, specifically, those provisions which
impact upon third countries. Third, the note will address how
the Directive impacts upon the sovereignty of third countries.
Fourth, relying on the case study, the concept of sovereignty as
it applies to the Internet will be further extrapolated to illus-
trate the shortcomings of traditional governmental regimes.
Ultimately, the note will conclude that conventional regulatory
regimes will have to be reassessed as a result of the Internet's
globalizing force if they are to conform with fundamental ten-
ets of international law.
II. SOVEREIGNTY AMONG NATIONS
A. Sovereign Rights
Sovereignty is a fundamental principle of international
law. 5 "The success of international law as a political and in-
tellectual discipline over the past four centuries has had much
12. "Third countries," and "third-party countries," as referred to in this note,
are not members of the European Union.
13. Directive, supra note 6, art. 25.
14. Schwartz, European Data Protection Law, supra note 11, at 473.
15. For example, the UN "is based on the principle of the sovereign equality
of all its Members." Charter of the United Nations, art. 2. MARC W. JANIS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 6, 10 (1988) (Explaining, "[tihe special char-
acter of international legal process, like the special nature of international legal
rules, is explicable in terms of state sovereignty ... The idea is that states by
virtue of their sovereignty may authoritatively regulate not only their own internal
affairs, but also their international relations.").
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to do with international law's utility in regulating and cement-
ing a world political system based more or less on sovereign
states."16 "Under international law, a sovereign state is an
entity that has defined territory and permanent population,
under the control of its own government, and that engages in,
or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other
such entities."7 Under certain circumstances states may
choose to act to protect and defend their domain, beyond their
defined physical boundaries."5 This may result in an en-
croachment upon another state's sovereignty, and often, takes
the form of war. 9
In the field of international relations, states are treated as
persons and interact with one another accordingly.2 As such,
an individual state has the right, "to defend its integrity and
independence, to provide for its conservation and prosperity,
and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate
upon its interests, administer its services, and to define the
jurisdiction and competence of its courts."2' The only limita-
tion upon these rights is the "exercise of the rights of other
states according to international law."22 The scope of a state's
16. JANIS, supra note 15, at 123. MARC W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 27 (1997) ("By virtue of their sovereign status, states are entitled
to an important number of international legal rights and are concomitantly obliged
by international legal duties. Central among these is the right of any sovereign
state to a status of international legal equality vis-a-vis other states.").
17. A.L.I. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 201 (1985) [hereinafter Restatement]. See also Convention on Rights and
Duties of States, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881, 3 Bevans 145, 165 L.N.T.S.
19; Montevideo Convention, December 26, 1933, entered into force December 26,
1934 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention]; Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir.
1995) (for a discussion concerning the recognition and succession of states and
governments). See generally JANIS, supra note 15.
18. See Montevideo Convention, supra note 17, at art. 3. See also Cyberspace
Regulation and the Discourse of State Sovereignty, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1680 (May
1999) [hereinafter Cyberspace Regulation] (Determining "an examination of the
Internet regulatory debate reveals three positive conceptions of state sovereignty:
the realist, the representational, and the postmodern." Specifically, it is the "real-
ist" conception which focuses on territorial boundaries as delimiting sovereignty.).
19. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (John Plamenatz ed., The Fontana Library 1967)
(1651) (Arguing that without a "Common Power" humankind, living in a state of
nature, would be forever in conflict, either at war or preparing for war. A state
operates as a common power over its citizens, but, without a common power over
the world's states, they act in conflict with one another in a constant state of
war.).
20. See Montevideo Convention, supra note 17, at art. 2.
21. Id. at art. 3.
22. Id. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
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sovereignty is, therefore, limited and defined by the reaches of
another state's sovereignty." Importantly, however, "[n]o
state has the right to intervene in the internal or external
affairs of another."
24
The result is a delicate balance wherein states must act to
the extent of their sovereign power without crossing an inde-
terminate line into the sovereignty of another state. Since
one state's sovereignty, and its rights thereunder, is defined by
the reaches of another state's sovereignty in relation to it,26
only by acting to the peripheral limits of that power can a
state maximize the scope of its sovereign rights. Conversely, a
state also will act to protect the outer boundaries of its sover-
dissent):
Under the Restatement, a nation having some 'basis' for jurisdiction
to prescribe law should nonetheless refrain from exercising that juris-
diction 'with respect to a person or activity having connections with
another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreason-
able. . . .The 'reasonableness' inquiry turns on a number of factors,
including, but not limited to: 'the extent to which the activity takes
place within the territory [of the regulating state],' id., § 403(2)(a);
'the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible
for the activity to be regulated,' id., § 403(2)(b); 'the character of the
activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulat-
ing state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities,
and the degree to which desirability of such regulation is generally
accepted,' id., § 403(2)(c); 'the extent to which another state may
have an interest in regulating the activity,' id., § 403(2)(g); and 'the
likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state,' id., §
403(2)(h).
(quoting AL.L Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States (1985)). As will be shown, none of these factors will be either 1) readily
applicable to an inherently international medium or, if found to be applicable, 2)
permit the conclusion that regulation by a single state is reasonable.
23. See Restatement, supra note 17, at § 201(h), 74 ("Whether an entity satis-
fies the requirements for statehood is ordinarily determined by other states when
they decide whether to treat that entity as a state.").
24. Montevideo Convention, supra note 17, at art. 8. See 1 OPPENHEIM'S IN-
TERNATIONAL LAv 295, and note 1 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955) ("A State must
not perform acts of sovereignty in the territory of another state.").
25. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 764 ("'[Ain act of Congress ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construc-
tion remains'. . . . It is relevant to determining the substantive reach of statutes
because "the law of nations," or customary international law, includes limitations
on a nation's exercise of its jurisdiction to prescribe." (quoting Murray v. Charming
Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804)).
26. See JANIS, supra note 15.
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eignty from encroachment by another state." By doing so, a
state can ensure the greatest breadth of sovereign rights.
Historically, states have attempted to clearly delineate
their sovereign domain.28 However, as explained above, sover-
eignty is conceptually defined 9 and not always congruent
with a state's physical, territorial borders. 0 Adding to this
uncertainty, a state's sovereignty interests in one area within
the international arena may be more expansive than its inter-
ests in another; again preventing clearly defined parame-
ters.3 The Internet's global reach further clouds these consid-
erations.
B. The "Effects Test"
Efforts by states to regulate the Internet also must take
into consideration a state's obligation under international law
not to intervene in the internal affairs of another nation.32 In
the United States, states often rely upon the "effects test"33 to
27. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976)
(declaring "nations have sometimes resented and protested, as excessive intrusions
into their own spheres, broad assertions of authority by American courts."). See,
e.g., U.S. v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996) (Providing an example of two
U.S. states competing to maintain their sovereign interest in the enforcement of
normative beliefs. Defendants, located in California, operated an electronic bulletin
board service containing pornography. They were convicted under a Tennessee
obscenity statute. On appeal, defendants contended that the trial court incorrectly
applied a Memphis community standard to determine obscenity rather than a
Californian standard, where the defendants were located, or, in the alternative, an
Internet community standard.). See also Cyberspace Regulation, supra note 18.
28. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 764 (defining "prescriptive comity"
as "the respect sovereign nations afford each other by limiting the reach of their
laws).
29. See Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937
(D.C.Cir. 1984) (defining comity as "a complex and elusive concept-the degree of
deference that a domestic forum must pay to the act of a foreign government not
otherwise binding on the forum").
30. Permitting, under the Restatement's reasonableness test, for example, in-
stances where a state's laws may appropriately reach beyond its physical borders.
Restatement, supra note 22. See U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 221 (2d
Cir. 1945).
31. See Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) ("Since comity varies according to the factual circumstances surrounding
each claim for its recognition, the absolute boundaries of the duties it imposes are
uncertain.").
32. See Montevideo Convention, supra note 17, at art. 8. See also Hartford
Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 764.
33. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (establishing the "effects test" as a
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determine the appropriateness of the application of their
state's law upon Internet activity occurring in another state.34
Simply, when a party's activity causes a result to occur in an-
other state, that party may be subject to the laws and juris-
diction of that state." The Internet's globalizing force unique-
ly results in an exponential increase in incidents requiring the
application of such principles. In fact, all Internet users can, by
virtue of their activity, find themselves subjected to the juris-
diction of a foreign government."
By extension, the "effects test" also can be used to gauge
the effects of a foreign state's laws upon another state;37 as
opposed to an entity's activity causing effects within a forum
warranting jurisdiction. In this capacity, the "effects test" is
used to determine infringements upon a state's sovereignty vis
a vfs another state's actions.38 The Internet represents a here-
tofore unparalleled medium in which one state's regulatory
efforts can influence the "internal affairs" of another. It is
almost impossible for a state to regulate the Internet without
means of determining personal jurisdiction).
34. See Cyberspace Regulation, supra note 18.
35. See Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997); Panavision
Int'l v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616 (CD Cal. 1996); NY CPLR § 302(a)(3). The
section permits a court to exercise:
personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or ad-
ministrator, who in person or through an agent
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to per-
son or property within the state
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have conse-
quences in the state and derives substantial revenue from inter-
state or international commerce.
Id. However, courts have attached a foreseeability requirement holding that the
defendant foresee, "the consequences generally and not to the specific event which
produced injury within the state." Fantis Foods, Inc. v. Standard Imp. Co., 49
N.Y.2d 317 (1980).).
36. See infra discussion in Section IV.
37. See Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 228 (In which Hand, J. stated it is
settled "that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its
allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its border
which the state reprehends.").
38. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976)
(declaring "it is evident that at some point the interests of the United States are
too weak and the foreign harmony incentive for restrain too strong to justify an
extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction.").
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causing a rippling extraterritorial effect resulting in impact
upon other states.
For example, a French law requires that all solicitations of
French citizens be made in the French language.39 According-
ly, all Web sites targeting French citizens for the sale of goods
and services must be in French.4" The law resulted in a suit
brought by the French government against Georgia Tech
Lorraine, a division of the Georgia Institute of Technology,
because its educational site, targeting French citizens, was
drafted only in English.4 Similarly, prosecution by German
officials for violation of a German anti-obscenity law forced
CompuServe, a multinational online service provider, to block
250 allegedly obscene newsgroups from all of its users world-
wide. Germany also has caused (tidal) waves in response to
Amazon.com's offering of fascist literature, in violation of Ger-
man law, on its U.S. directed Web site.4" While Amazon.com
has a site specifically targeting German citizens, which does
not offer such material, Germans nevertheless can access the
U.S. Amazon site over the Internet; thereby circumventing
Amazon.com's attempt at compliance and resulting in its crimi-
nal liability.44
C. The European Union and Sovereignty
The Directive serves as a prime example of an Internet
regulatory scheme that has a far reaching and significant im-
pact beyond the borders of the regulating entity." Interesting-
39. See Ian C. Ballon, The Law of the Internet: Developing A Framework for
Making New Law (Part II), Cyberspace Lawyer, 2 No. 10, CYBERSPACE LAW, 16, 1,
January 1998.
40. See Ballon, supra note 39; Mark Owen, International Ramifications of
Doing Business Online: Europe, 564 PLI/Pat 263, 285 (1999)
41. See Ballon, supra note 39; Owen, supra note 40, at 285.
42. See Ballon, supra note 39; Owen, supra note 40, at 285. Additionally, the
former managing director of CompuServe Germany was sentenced to two years in
prison because the court found that CompuServe's servers disseminated the ob-
scene material. However, the sentence was suspended upon payment of a fine. Id.
at 285.
43. See Free Speech and Other Dilemmas for Web Retailers, N.Y.L.J., Vol. 222,
No. 39, August 24, 1999. The article quoted Michael S. Mensik, a partner at Bak-
er & McKenzie, explaining that, "German courts generally don't care where you
are, or how many clicks it takes to get to you. If you're providing illegal content
to people in Germany, you're liable under German law."
44. See id.; Ballon, supra note 39.
45. See infra discussion in Section IV.
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ly, the Directive is the result of an international union, rather
than a single nation-state. However, the European Union acts
in many ways like a sovereign state within the international
arena.46 While the history and dimensions of the E.U. are be-
yond the scope of this article, certain components of the
Union's role within the international community are important
to this discussion.
Arguably, the European Union is a sovereign entity in and
unto itself.47 "Member countries have agreed to pool some of
their sovereign powers for the sake of unity, just as American
states did to create a federal republic." 8 The E.U. is, there-
fore, the result of that "pool" and has the ability to exercise
certain sovereign powers relinquished to it by the Member
States.49 "The Member States work together, in their collec-
tive interest, through the joint administration of their sover-
eign powers."" However, Member States also retain their
own, individual sovereignty,5 specifically in the areas of na-
46. See EUROPEAN UNION: A GUIDE FOR AMERICANS 3 (1998) [hereinafter E.U.
GUIDE]; Restatement, supra note 17, at § 201, Reporter's Notes n.6, p.75 ("The
creation of the European Community did not terminate the statehood of its con-
stituent members, although the Community assumed international responsibility
for a number of matters previously in the control of the individual states. The
Community is not a state, but it has become party to some international agree-
ments in its own right."). An example of this is the E.U.'s membership in the
World Trade Organization singly, as well as by virtue of the membership of its
Member States, again illustrating its quasi-sovereign status within the internation-
al arena. About the WTO (February 9, 1998), at http://www.wto.org/wto/
abouttorgansn3.htm.
47. See supra note 46.
48. E.U. GUIDE, supra note 46, at 4, 6.
49. Id. at 4.
50. Id. at 6.
51. The concept of segmented sovereignty can be viewed as a paradox. For
example, if a state relinquishes its sovereign power, it is no longer sovereign since
it has surrendered a degree of control over itself, negating its sovereignty. Hobbes
maintains sovereignty is absolute. Therefore, when an entity relinquishes any of
its sovereignty to a higher power, it surrenders all of its sovereignty.
The E.U. attempts to circumvent this paradox though the principle of
"subsidiarity" which permits it to act only in those matters, "that cannot be han-
dled effectively at lower levels of government, i.e., national, regional, or local."
E.U. GUIDE, supra note 46, at 7. In one of the first adjudicated cases to address
this paradox, the British House of Lords held that the U.K. was a sovereign state
within the E.U. However, the court also held that an Act of Parliament could be
stayed by virtue of an injunction granted by the European Court of Justice. The
House reasoned that the U.K. was merely consenting to the injunction, a choice
only a sovereign entity could make, even though a foreign body was imposing
itself upon the sovereign will of Parliament. This permitted Parliament to retain
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tional security and defense, and criminal prosecution.52
The E.U.'s role in the international community was fur-
ther solidified through passage of the Maastricht Treaty 3
which "made it constitutionally possible to achieve Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU), and to develop the Union's inher-
ent political dimension through the new Common Foreign and
Security Policy,"54 thus conforming with the principal determi-
nant of a sovereign state - the establishment of a political will
recognized by other states.55 Furthermore, recent passage of
the Amsterdam Treaty6 represents an attempt by the E.U. to
harmonize its foreign policy activity permitting it to act in for-
eign relations on behalf of the Member States.57 The Europe-
an Union is clearly positioning itself, if it has not done so al-
ready, to assume the rights and obligations of a sovereign state
(in the form of a sovereign region) within the international
community; particularly as it now chooses to interact with
other sovereign states." Accordingly, the E.U. is now in a po-
sition to assume the rights and obligations of an international
actor.59 It must adhere to principles of international law and
must restrict its actions so as not to interfere in the internal
affairs of third-party sovereign states."0
Within this capacity, U.S. representatives have been nego-
tiating with E.U. representatives regarding the Directive, rath-
er than the individual Member States.6 This is particularly
its sovereignty while acquiescing to a foreign authority. Regina v. Sec'y of State
for Transp., ex parte Factortame Ltd., [19911 1 A.C. 603, [1989] 2 W.L.R. 998.
52. See E.U. GUIDE, supra note 46, at 4; Directive, supra note 6, art. 3, para
2, art. 13(1)(a)-(d); E.U. Commission Directorate General 15, Data Protection: Back-
ground Information (Nov. 3, 1998), at httpJ/www.europa.eu.int/comm/dglS/en/
media/dataprot/law/ [hereinafter Background Information]; Cate, Data Protection
Law, supra note 1, at 434.
53. See TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, 1992 O.J. (C 224) (entered into force
Nov. 1, 1993).
54. E.U. GUIDE, supra note 46, at 5.
55. See supra Section II.A.
56. Amsterdam Treaty, 1997 O.J. (C 340) (Nov. 10, 1997) [hereinafter Amster-
dam Treaty].
57. See id. See also E.U. GUIDE, supra note 46, at 5.
58. See Amsterdam Treaty, supra note 56. See also E.U. GUIDE, supra note
46, at 5.
59. See supra Section II.A.
60. See Montevideo Convention, supra note 17, at art. 8. See also supra Sec-
tion II.A.
61. See U.S. International Trade Administration Electronic Commerce Task
Force, "Safe Harbor Principles," at http://www.ita.doc.gov/ecom/menu.htm (last visit-
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interesting since it is the Member States that unilaterally
implement national legislation in conformance with the Direc-
tive62 and determine whether third countries evidence ade-
quate data protection.63 The Union's involvement is legisla-
tively limited to instances wherein a conflict arises and the
matter is appealed to the Commission.' The question then
arises as to what extent the E.U. will be able to represent the
individual Member States' varying, albeit harmonized, data
protection policies." Nevertheless, these negotiations have
arisen out of concern for certain provisions of the Directive,66
specifically, its requirement that Member States block data
transmissions to third countries without adequate data protec-
tion.67
Beyond the provisions requiring the blocking of data, 8
the Directive also results in the imposition upon third coun-
tries of a de facto requirement to create new policies and im-
plement new technologies to ensure adequacy.69  The
Directive's scope extends to "grant the right to every person
not to be subject to a decision which produces legal effects
concerning him or significantly affects him and which is based
solely on automated processing of data intended to evaluate
certain personal aspects relating to him, such as his perfor-
mance at work, creditworthiness, reliability, conduct, etc.""
Accordingly, third countries will have to adopt additional
ed Nov. 15, 1999).
62. Directive, supra note 6, art. 4, para 1.
63. Id. art. 25, paras 1-3.
64. See id. art. 25, paras. 3-6.
65. See infra Section III.A. The E.U. representatives are members of the Arti-
cle 29 Working Group which consists of national data protection commissioners.
66. See Cate, supra note 1, at 437-439. See also SWIRE, supra note 2, at 3;
Owen, supra note 40, at 281; Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Margaret G. Stewart, False
Alarm?, 51 Fed. Comm. L.J. 811, 812 (1999).
67. Directive, supra note 6, art. 25.
68. See id.
69. Id. art. 15(1). This is further evidenced by European officials efforts, "to
encourage the United States and other third countries to adopt comprehensive
privacy legislation. By deemphasizing the use of [private] contracts and other [self-
regulatory models], the Europeans can try to apply more pressure on other coun-
tries to adopt privacy-protection legislation." See also SwIRE, supra note 2, at 56;
Cate, Data Protection Law, supra note 1, at 438 ("The European data protectors
view the current situation as an excellent opportunity to put pressure on Canada
and the United States for improved data protection.").
70. Directive, supra note 6, art. 15(1).
2000] 699
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protections in order to adequately comply with the breadth of
the Directive.71 The reach of the Directive, therefore, extends
beyond the territorial boundaries of the Union and causes
significant, if not severe, effects in third-party sovereign states
forcing their adherence to the will of a foreign authority.
III. EUROPEAN UNION DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE
A. Directive Background
The Directive does not mark Europe's first step at ensur-
ing privacy protection for data. In 1981, the Council of Europe
implemented the Convention for the Protection of Individuals
with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data ["Con-
vention"].72 The purpose of the Convention was, "to secure in
the territory of each Party for every individual, whatever his
nationality or residence, respect for his rights and fundamental
freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy, with regard to
automatic processing of personal data relating to him ("data
protection")."73 The Directive clearly represents an extension
upon the Convention particularized to the nuances of the Infor-
mation Age.74 Accordingly, the object of the Directive is to,
"protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural per-
sons, and in particular their right to privacy with respect to
the processing of personal data."75
The Directive requires Member States to enact legislation
implementing its terms.76 The harmonization77 of Member
71. See Owen, supra note 40, at 283.
72. Convention, supra note 7.
73. Id. art. 1.
74. The Directive also represents a focused effort by the E.U. toward political
unity. Whereas the Convention was intended to permit open markets within the
E.U., the transition from the Convention to the Directive mirrors the E.U.'s own
transition from a market focused community toward a political union. See Simitis,
From the Market to the Polis: The E.U. Directive on the Protection of Personal
Data, 80 IOWA L. REV. 445, 446-447; Cate, Data Protection Law, supra note 1, at
432.
75. Directive, supra note 6, art. 1, para. 1.
76. Id. art. 4, para. 1.
77. See Schwartz, European Data Protection Law, supra note 11, at 481 ("Har-
monization is a technical term of European Community law that refers to formal
attempts to increase the similarity of legal measures in Member Nations. A har-
monizing directive does not seek absolute uniformity of law, but the establishment
of 'a basic structure, with more or less detailed provisions, to which Member
States must conform.") (quoting GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERI-
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State laws will ensure equivalent data protection throughout
the European Union.7" The "person, public authority, agency
or any other body which alone or jointly with others deter-
mines the purposes and means of the processing of personal
data,"79 the data controller, is responsible for compliance with
domestic law, rather than the end user.0 The data controller
is governed by the laws of the Member State in which it is
established.8 ' "Establishment" means the data controller
physically exists within the territory of a Member State 2 and
"implies the effective and real exercise of activity through
stable arrangements."83 However, the Directive continues to
afford protection even if the data controller is established in a
third country.84 In such a scenario, the "processing should be
governed by the law of the Member State in which the means
used are located, and there should be guarantees to ensure
that the rights and obligations provided for in this Directive
are respected in practice."85
Specifically, the Directive imposes four obligations upon
the data controller, and grants five rights to the data subject.
To promote the principles of the Directive, the data controller
must ensure the: 1) data quality; 2) technical security; 3) noti-
fication to the supervisory authority; and, 4) circumstances
under which processing can be carried out. 6 Conversely, the
data subject is entitled: 1) to the data of which they are the
subject of processing; 2) to be informed that processing is tak
ALS ON EUROPEAN COmiUNrly LAW 430 (1993)).
78. Directive, supra note 6, at Preamble, para. 8; Background Information,
supra note 52, at http'//www.europa.eu.int/commldgl5/en/media/dataprot/law/ (last
visited Oct. 18, 2000).
79. Directive, supra note 6, art. 2(d).
80. See id. at Preamble, para 18.
81. See id. N.Y. L.J., Proposed Directive is an Important Step, vol. 222, no.
17, July 26, 1999, at col. 2. This also is known as the "country of origin" rule. See
also Owen, supra note 40, at 270.
82. Directive, supra note 6, art. 3(1)(a).
83. Id. at art. 3(1)(a), Preamble, para 19. If a single controller is established
in many states, "it must ensure, in order to avoid any circumvention of national
rules, that each of the establishments fulfils the obligations imposed by the nation-
al law applicable to its activities." Id.
84. Id. at art. 3(1)(c).
85. Directive, supra note 6, at Preamble, para 20 and art. 4.
86. See id. at Preamble, para. 25.
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ing place; 3) to consult the data; 4) to request corrections; and,
5) to object to processing in certain circumstances.87
B. Transfer of Data to Third Countries: The Adequacy
Requirement
Article 25 of the Directive requires third countries to es-
tablish an "adequate level of protection" for data to permit
transfers from a Member State.
The Member States shall provide that the transfer to a third
country of personal data which are undergoing processing or
are intended for processing after transfer may take place only
if, without prejudice to compliance with the national provi-
sions adopted pursuant to the other provisions of this Direc-
tive, the third country in question ensures an adequate level
of protection."
Each Member State is responsible for determining, "in light of
all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer opera-
tion," 9 whether a third country has such protections. The
Member States and the E.U. Commission are then to pool their
knowledge regarding the protections afforded in third countries
and, "shall take the measures necessary to prevent any trans-
fer of data of the same type to the third country in ques-
tion."" Consequently, "[t]he Directive establishes rules de-
signed to ensure that data is only transferred to countries
outside the E.U. when its continued protection is guaranteed
or when certain exceptions apply."
91
87. See id. at Preamble, para. 25 and art. 7(a)-(f).
88. Id. at art. 25, para. 1 (emphasis added.).
89. Id. at para 2.
90. Id.
91. Background Information, supra note 52. The exceptions include transfers:
1) with the data subject's consent; 2) relating to the performance of a contract in-
volving the data subject; 3) relating to the performance of a contract in the inter-
est of the data subject; 4) in furtherance of an important public interest; and, 5)
from a register intended to provide such information to the public. Directive, supra
note 6, at art. 26, paras. 1(a)-(f). See Greenleaf, Global Protection of Privacy in
Cyberspace, at http://www2.austlii.edu.au/itlaw/articles/TaiwanSTLC-3.html (last
visited Jan. 8, 2000). The Directive's outright prohibition against data transfers to
certain states "is in stark contrast . . . to the two previous major international
privacy instruments, the OECD privacy Guidelines and the Council of Europe
privacy Convention . . . Neither of these agreements require their signatories to
impose export restrictions on non-signatory countries, or on countries which do not
provide an equivalent degree of protection." Id.
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To allay concerns regarding a blacklist scenario, the E.U.
has been careful to explicate that "[a] decision to block a trans-
fer would only apply to other transfers of the same type, not to
all transfers to the country concerned."92 However, European
countries have a history of preventing transfers of information
both in and out of the Union,93 making the threat of data
blockages a genuine concern for third countries94 who have
not adhered to the E.U.'s adequacy requirement.95 Further-
more, threats to third countries may lead to reverse blackouts
wherein foreign countries choose not to conduct business with-
in the E.U. for fear of sanction and civil liability.
In the European Union, privacy is considered a fundamen-
tal human right.96 Therefore, the Directive seeks not only to
protect E.U. citizens' privacy generally, but does so within the
context of protecting a fundamental right requiring "protection
of a high degree, which in the Union's language means the
maximum possible."97 The adequacy requirement is, therefore,
quite demanding and extensive when applied to the limitless
reaches of the Internet. "The duty to safeguard the fundamen-
tal rights of the Union's citizens does not end at the frontiers
of the Union. On the contrary, the Union is no less bound to
achieve a high degree of protection for all transborder flows of
92. Background Information, supra note 52 (Emphasis added.).
93. See discussion, supra at 17.
94. At present, the U.S., for example, does not have adequate data protection
in accordance with the E.U.'s standards. See Tom S. Onyshko & Lesia A. Stangret,
Privacy and the Internet: Recent Developments in Canada, the U.S. and Europe, 4
N.2 Cyberspace Law 2 (1999); Ballon, supra note 39. However, the recently agreed
upon "Safe Harbor Principles" were developed to circumvent this problem. See
infra, Section IV.B.3.
95. See Cate, Data Protection Law, supra note 1, at 439.
96. See Directive, supra note 6, at Preamble, paras. 1, 2 and art. 1, para. 1.
Treaty on the European Union, Title I - Common Provisions - art. F, para. 2
("The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms . . .
and as they result from the Constitutional traditions common to Member States,
as general principles of Community Law."); European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8, para. 1, Nov. 4, 1950 [here-
inafter Human Rights Convention] ("Everyone has the right to respect for his
private and family life, his home and his correspondence."). See also The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, art. 12, G.A. Resolution 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810,
at 71 (1948) ("No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such attacks.").
97. Simitis, supra note 74, at 448.
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data."98
Further, even in view of the effort toward harmoniza-
tion,99 states are nevertheless permitted to implement legisla-
tion affording greater protection than required by the Direc-
tive' or by other Members.'' For example, France, a
Member State, acted under domestic law to prohibit a "French
subsidiary of an Italian parent company from transferring data
to Italy [another Member State] because Italy did not have an
omnibus data protection law" to ensure equivalency. 1°2
France also has "required that identifying information be re-
moved from patient records before they could be transferred to
Belgium, Switzerland and the United States." °3
Since each Member State is responsible for determining a
third country's adequacy, such unavoidable "disparities" °4 in
regulation among Member States means the adequacy require-
ment could be raised to meet the highest bar established by
any single Member State."5 Potentially then, the degree of
98. Id.
99. In fact, contrary to the E.U.'s continued efforts toward economic and polit-
ical unity, Member states continue to cling to their unique identities and resist as-
similation into a European nation-state. See, e.g., Marlise Simons, In New Europe,
a Lingual Hodgepodge: Old Tongues Are Flourishing in a Revival of Regional Cul-
tures, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1999, at D2.
100. Directive, supra note 6, at art. 5 stating, "Member States shall, within the
limits of the provisions of this Chapter, determine more precisely the conditions
under which the processing of personal data is lawful."
Because some Member States have delayed complying with the Directive's
three year time frame for implementation, the Commission placed nine Member
States on notice urging conformance with the Directive and indicating individuals
who suffer losses due to a State's failure to implement may seek compensation in
the national courts. Data protection: Commission decides to send reasoned opinions
to nine Member States (July 29, 1999), at http'//europa.eu.intcomm/dgl5/en/medial
dataprot/news99-592.htm [hereinafter Commission decides]. The Directive requires
Member States to enact laws to provide for civil remedies against data controllers
pursuant to article 24. See SWIRE, supra note 2.
101. See Cate, The Globalization of Law, supra note 2.
102. See id. at 483.
103. Id. at 483.
104. Commission decides, supra note 100. See also Simitis, supra note 74, at
464 ("Experience has shown that the primary interest of the Member States is not
to achieve new, union-wide principles, but rather to preserve their own, familiar
rules."); Schwartz, European Data Protection Law, supra note 11, at 473.
105. See Commission decides, supra note 100 ("The Directive also establishes
rules to ensure that personal data is only transferred to countries outside the E.U.
when its continued protection is guaranteed, so as to ensure that the high stan-
dards of protection introduced by the Directive within the E.U. are not under-
mined.") (emphasis added). See also Simitis, supra note 74, at 464; Schwartz, Eu-
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protection sought is without limits and the corresponding ade-
quacy requirement may be similarly expansive. As individual
Member States demand greater protections, other Members
will be forced to conform to ensure equivalency. Again, the bar
is raised and the adequacy requirement made more stringent.
Accordingly, individual Member States, in their heightened
demand for greater protections, could impose greater obliga-
tions upon third countries, increasing the degree of interfer-
ence into those countries' internal, sovereign affairs.
Discounting the disparities in regulation among E.U.
Member States for a moment, similar disparities among differ-
ent third countries also are likely to result in the establish-
ment of the most restrictive regulatory scheme." 6 Political,
economic and technological pressures, combined with a desire
to achieve uniformity, suggest such regulations tend "to have a
de facto extra-territorial effect,""°' intruding upon the will of
sovereign states. Ultimately, therefore, the Directive could
result in a race to the top in which various states compete to
ensure greater degrees of data protection, without regard for
the ramifications of their actions upon foreign states, or for the
resulting stifling of information flow.'
IV. THE DIRECTIVE'S EFFECT ON THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THIRD
COUNTRIES
A. The "Establishment" Provision
As illustrated above,"9 the Directive's "establishment"
provision"0 claims governance over data controllers pursuant
to the national laws in the country in which they are physical-
ly located."' Additionally, the Directive also claims authority
over data controllers in third countries who "make use of
equipment""' in a Member State. For example, depending
ropean Data Protection Law, supra note 11, at 487 (Explaining that many Member
States initially expressed concern that the Directive might lower their already high
standards for data protection.).
106. See Perritt and Stewart, supra note 66, at 812-813.
107. Id.
108. See infra Section IV.B.
109. See supra Section III.A.
110. Directive, supra note 6, at Preamble, para. 18 and art. 4.
111. Id.
112. Directive, supra note 6, at art. 4(1)(c) ("Each Member State shall apply
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upon interpretation, "a U.S. Web site 'makes use of equipment'
in France or Germany when a user accesses the site from one
of those countries."' This clause potentially extends the
Directive's influence over any entity in any location. According-
ly, the Directive's regulatory reach into third countries is con-
ceivably without limits."'
Application of the "effects test" exemplifies the degree to
which the Directive may influence the internal affairs of sover-
eign nations."' The potential extraterritorial effect of the
E.U.'s Directive is to halt data transfers"6 and promote or
even require the implementation of data protection policies,
legislation, and technologies within third countries."7 The
test, therefore, effectively illustrates the Directive's encroach-
ment upon the sovereignty of third countries."'
Simply, the Internet is a global network."' By seeking to
regulate an international medium,2 ' the E.U. necessarily
must unilaterally impose its will upon the medium as a
whole-it cannot simply regulate that portion of the Internet
which exists within its physical territory since data transfers
do not recognize boundaries established in the bricks and mor-
tar world.'2' Regardless of the blurred lines demarcating a
state's sovereign interests,'22 the Directive's scope necessarily
extends beyond the E.U.'s defined territorial boundaries.'
the national provisions it adopts pursuant to this Directive to the processing of
personal data where: . . . the controller is not established on Community territory
and, for purposes of processing personal data makes use of equipment, automated
or otherwise, situated on the territory of the said member State . . . ") (emphasis
added).
113. See SWIRE, supra note 2, at 69.
114. Owen, supra note 40, at 283 ("The restriction may have a huge impact in
circumstances where it is necessary to transfer any data to the U.S. and this of
course includes any provision of personal data by an E.U. user via a U.S. Web
site.").
115. See supra Section II.A.
116. Directive, supra note 6, at art. 35, para. 4.
117. See SWVIRE, supra note 2, at 56.
118. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976);
U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1945).
119. See Cate, Data Protection Law, supra note 1, at 441-442.
120. See Cate, The Globalization of Law, supra note 2, at 467-468.
121. See Cate, Data Protection Law, supra note 1, at 441. See also Cate, The
Globalization of Law, supra note 2.
122. See supra Section II.AL
123. An enduring principle of American law dictates "that legislation of Con-
gress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territo-
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Therefore, to ensure the maximum protection of privacy," as
warranted by what the E.U. perceives to be a fundamental
right,2 ' it must prescribe and enforce the Directive's
protectionary measures wherever the Internet extends.
Does the European Union's sovereign interest similarly
extend beyond its physical borders? As explained above, 2 '
pursuant to international law one, state's sovereign interest is
defined by that of another state.2 7 Therefore, the point at
which a third country has exercised its own right to legislate
within the privacy sphere represents the point at which the
Directive must cease to control. 2 ' The problem is that at this
rather penumbral barrier a polarized conflict of interests arises
between various states.29
B. Privacy v. The Free Flow of Information
1. The Delicate Balance
At the heart of this issue is an attempted balance between
individuals' privacy and the need to transmit data relating to
individuals, 3 ' particularly in the Information Age. 3' As
rial jurisdiction of the United States." Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,
285 (1949); Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 764. In fact, Justice Holmes ex-
plained that a canon of statutory interpretation "would lead, in case of doubt, to a
construction of any statute as intended to be confined in its operation and effect
to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate pow-
er. 'All legislation is prima facie territorial'." Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,
213 U.S. 347, 407 (1921) (citing Ex parte Blain, L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 522, 528).
While Holmes' general proposition has been substantially limited, the territorial
principle remains a viable determinant, among several, for a state's proper asser-
tion of its jurisdiction. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp. Int'l, 493
U.S. 400, 406-408 (1990).
124. See supra Section III.B.
125. Id.
126. See supra Section II.A.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1976).
129. This conflict also exists within the E.U. as various Member States indi-
vidually seek to determine the level of protection necessary to achieve harmoni-
zation with the Directive. Member States define jurisdiction differently and how
each interprets the extent of their data protection regulations likely will result in
dissension. See Joel R. Reidenberg and Paul M. Schwartz, Data Protection Law
and On-Line Services: Regulatory Responses, at
http'//europa.eu.int/commtdgl5/en/media/dataprot/studies/regul.htm (last visited
Jan. 8, 2000).
130. The OECD, which has been addressing the protection of privacy and
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discussed, privacy is at best a fundamental right,3 2 and per-
haps, only slightly less so, a dominant concern of most indus-
trialized societies.' 3 ' On the Internet, the lack of privacy'34
has created unique interests among governments and private
groups to obtain, transmit, sell and otherwise disseminate
personal information."5 "In fact, an entire industry has
emerged to market a variety of software products designed to
assist Web sites in collecting and analyzing visitor data and in
serving targeted advertising."3 ' Furthermore, the Internet's
transborder flows of data since at least 1980, also has recognized these competing
principles in its efforts to "affirm the commitment to protect individual privacy in
the increasingly networked environment, both to uphold human rights and to pre-
vent interruptions in transborder data flows." Workshop on "Privacy Protection in
a Global Networked Society" Feb. 1998, excerpted at
http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/ittsecur/actlprivnote.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2000) [here-
inafter OECD Workshop].
Interestingly, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, which protects privacy, also affords protection to the
sharing of information. Human Rights Convention, supra note 96, at art. 10, para
1, Rome, 4, Nov. 1950 ("Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.").
Even the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, provides protection for both
privacy and the dissemination of information. Article 19 states, "Everyone has the
right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers." Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, supra note 96, at art. 19 (emphasis added).
131. "The Internet has made it easier for anyone to collect personal information
about others." SWIRE, supra note 2, at vii.
132. See supra Section III.B.
133. Id.
134. See Georgetown Internet Privacy Policy Survey: Report to the Federal
Trade Commission, June 1999, at
http:/www.msb.edu/faculty/culnanm/gippshome.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 1999) (de-
termining that of the 361 Web sites surveyed, 93% collected user information);
Privacy and the Top 100 Web Sites: Report to the Federal Trade Commission,
June 1999, at http://www.msb.edu/faculty/culnanm/gippshome.htm (last visited Nov.
12, 1999) (determining that of the top 100 most frequently visited Web sites, 99%
collect user information).
135. See Little Brother, Thomas L. Friedman, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1999. "The
architecture of cyberspace is highly influenced by commerce and government, 'both
of which have an interest in knowing as much as they can about what people are
doing and where . . . So it's not an accident that the emerging Internet architec-
ture makes it easier to track people and collect private data, because tracking
people is what governments like and collecting private data is what commerce
likes.'" Id. (quoting Professor Lawrence Lessig).
136. SELF-REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS, FTC,
July 1999, at 2, at http://www.ftc.gov (last visited on Nov. 12, 1999) [hereinafter
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architecture has evolved around electronic commerce which
serves as the bedrock of much Internet activity and represents
the source of the attraction toward personal data."7 Compa-
nies engaging in electronic commerce have a significant inter-
est in personal data, and its transfer online.' "Transborder
data flow has become indispensable to the very existence of
transnational enterprise and to the currently flourishing global
marketplace . . . Information is the lifeblood that sustains
political, social, and business decisions.""9 Interestingly then,
electronic commerce depends upon consumers who unfortu-
nately approach the Internet with trepidation 4 ' from the
harvesting of their personal data to further electronic com-
merce.
14 1
The E.U. recognizes the need to achieve a balance between
these competing interests, and strives, within the context of
the Directive, to do so. As discussed above, the first objective of
the Directive is to protect the fundamental right of privacy.
However, the second object of the Directive cautions that
FTC REPORT].
137. See Friedman, supra note 135; FTC REPORT, supra note 136 (citing a U.S.
Dept. of Commerce report that online sales tripled from approximately $3 billion
in 1997, to approximately $9 billion in 1998.).
138. See id. Cate, Data Protection Law, supra note 1, at 439 ("Although figures
vary, information services and products are either the first or second largest sector
of the U.S. economy, accounting for between ten and twelve percent of Gross Do-
mestic Product" and representing "more then 4.5 million U.S. jobs."). Note: These
figures are from 1994 and likely have dramatically increased since then. It is safe
to presume that the importance and value of electronic commerce has experienced
a corresponding increase.
139. Cate, The Globalization of Law, supra note 2, at 471-472 (quoting Anne
W. Branscomb, Global Governance of Global Networks: A Survey of Transborder
Data Flow in Transition, 36 Vand. L. Rev. 985, 989 (1991)).
140. A Little Privacy Please, BUS. WK., March 16, 1998, at 98.
141. See OECD Workshop, supra note 130, at 5. Privacy Protection in a Global
Networked Society, OECD, Feb. 1998 ("[P]rivacy protection is one of the critical
elements of consumer and user trust in the online environment and a sine quo
non for the development of electronic commerce."). See FEDERAL TRADE COMMIS-
SION, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (1998) (Survey found 85% of Web
sites collect personal data about consumers, 14% disclose their information collec-
tion practices, and 2% provide a privacy policy.).
For an interesting discussion on European efforts to protect consumer inter-
ests, see Samantha Mitchell, Cross Border Disputes: To Sue or Not to Sue?, CON-
SUMER POLICY REVIEWS, Vol. 9, Issue 3, May 1, 1999.
142. Directive, supra note 6, at art. 1, para. 1. "In accordance with this Direc-
tive, Member States shall protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural
persons, and in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of
personal data." Id.
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"Member States shall neither restrict nor prohibit the free flow
of personal data between Member States for reasons connected
with the protection" of personal privacy.' The question at
hand is whether the European Union, in an attempt to effectu-
ate such a delicate balance, is unilaterally imposing its own
regulatory scheme upon sovereign nations, due to an innate
inability to regulate the technology without such an encroach-
ment.
2. The European Union's Response
The E.U. has recognized concerns expressed by third coun-
tries regarding its alleged intrusion upon their sovereignty.'
In a response to these concerns, the E.U. has compiled a FAQ
answering twelve questions solely regarding the Directive's
adequacy requirement and its extraterritorial effect upon third
countries. 4 ' The final question asks, 'W/hy is the E.U. trying
to impose its system on other countries? Is this not a case of
'extraterritoriality'?""46 In response, the Union contends,
There is no desire to "export" the E.U. system to other coun-
tries. There are clearly different ways of arriving at the same
results, but we need to ensure that personal data of E.U.
citizens transferred outside the E.U. is being processed with
due respect for certain widely accepted principles, that citi-
zens can enforce their rights and that they are entitled to
redress if they suffer damage as a result of a breach of these
principals. We are conscious of the need to avoid procedures
for blocking data transfers which are exclusively unilateral.
Non-E.U. countries concerned need to be informed and given
the chance to express their views."4'
Interestingly, the E.U. refers to "certain widely accepted prin-
143. Directive, supra note 6, at art. 1, para. 2. The Convention similarly high-
lights the E.U.'s historical recognition of this balancing effort, dating back to 1981.
The Preamble states, "Considering that it is desirable to extend the safeguards for
everyone's rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular the right to the
respect for privacy, taking account of the increasing flow across frontiers of personal
data undergoing automatic processing." Convention, supra note 7 (emphasis added).
144. See Owen, supra note 40, at 281.
145. Background Information, supra note 52. In this ten-page document, five
pages address concerns regarding the E.U.'s limitations on the transfer of data to
third countries.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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ciples" in support of the privacy right. Doubtless, however,
these principles may not be as "widely accepted"' as the
E.U. seems to indicate judging from the resulting controversy
surrounding its protection of them.5 ' Moreover, as detailed
above,'5 ' another "widely accepted principle" prohibits inter-
ference in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation. Has the
E.U. (unilaterally) determined that the right to privacy trumps
this principle of international law?
Further, the E.U.'s willingness to give third countries the
"chance to express their views ' may be limited to just that,
an opportunity for expression without necessarily a willingness
to compromise. For example, the Chair of the Council of
Europe's Data Protection Experts Committee has stated:
Contrary to most other documents and nearly for the first
time in the history of the Community, the Commission in its
draft said that the need for the Directive is based on the need
to protect human rights within the Community. This is why,
when we speak of data protection within the Union, we speak
of the necessity to respect fundamental rights of the citizens.
Therefore, data protection may be a subject on which you can
have different answers to the various problems, but it is not
a subject you can bargain about.'53
Ostensibly, the E.U. recognizes the fine line the Directive
treads and the difficulty, if not impossibility, of affording such
protection on the Internet without interfering with in internal
affairs of third countries. However, its concern for internation-
al law is apparently outweighed by its own sovereign interest
in protecting its citizens' rights.
148. Id.
149. In the E.U.'s defense, similar privacy principles have, to a degree, been
"widely accepted" in the form of the OECD's Privacy Policy, which has been "ac-
cepted" by numerous states. However, the mere acceptance of the policy is mitigat-
ed by the fact that far fewer states have actually acted pursuant to its recommen-
dations. OECD Workshop, supra note 130.
150. See Cate, Data Protection Law, supra note 1. See also infra Section IV.B.3.
151. See supra Section II.
152. Background Information, supra note 52.
153. Cate, Data Protection Law, supra note 1, at 438 (emphasis added).
2000]
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3. The European Union and the United States
The United States, for example, also has recognized the
need to effectuate such a balance. The U.S. has acknowledged
the need "to assure personal privacy in the networked environ-
ment if people are to feel comfortable doing business""4 must
be weighed against "fundamental and cherished principles like
the First Amendment, which is an important hallmark of
American democracy protect[ing] the free flow of informa-
tion."155 However, unlike the E.U., the U.S. has chosen to for-
go a governmental regulatory scheme in favor of dependance
upon private sector self-regulation.156 Herein lies the genesis
of dissension between the E.U. and U.S. approaches to this is-
sue."7 While the E.U. seeks proactive legislation, the U.S. is
relying upon private industry to achieve this balance.158 The
154. A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 10, at
http://www.iitf.nist.gov/eleccommlecomm.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 1999) [hereinafter
FRAMEWORK].
155. Id. The International Safe Harbor recommends that U.S. organizations
voluntarily self-certify their adequacy in accordance with E.UJU.S. proposed priva-
cy principles. While the negotiations were closed, agreement was difficult and
delayed "because one or the other side is subject to legal constraints. This category
includes, for example, several instances in which the [European] Commission's pro-
posed changes conflicted with the First Amendment." Cover Letter from Ambassa-
dor David L. Aaron to U.S. organizations requesting comments on the newly-posted
draft documents - November 15, 1999, at
http'//www.ita.doc.gov/ecom/aaronmemo1199.htm.
156. See FRAMEWORK, supra note 154, at 11; Draft International Safe Harbor
Privacy Principles Issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce, at
http://www.ita.doc.gov/ecom/aaroamemo1199.htm (last visited on Nov. 15, 1999)
("While the United States and the European Union share the goal of enhancing
privacy protection of their citizens, the United States takes a different approach to
privacy from that taken by the European Community. The United States uses a
sectoral approach that relies on a mix of legislation, regulation, and self regula-
tion."). See also Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 Vand.
L. Rev. 1609, 24-25 (1999) [hereinafter Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy].
157. See Welcome to the Internet, The First Global Colony, Steve Lohr, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 9, 2000, at D5. See generally supra Section IV.B.1.
158. See Cate, Data Protection Law, supra note 1, at 438. The OECD has con-
ducted workshops in an effort to harmonize government and self-regulatory ap-
proaches and achieve a degree of uniformity in online privacy protection methodol-
ogies. OECD Workshop, supra note 130.
The FTC issued a second report, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRAC-
TICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE, FTC, May 2000, in which the Commis-
sion called for legislative action by a vote of 3-2. However, "Idlespite the publicity
surrounding the FTC's new report, the 106th Congress is expected to do little, if
anything, of substance regarding the issue before it adjourns for the November
elections." FTC Backs Its Online Privacy Report, Keith Perine, THE STANDARD,
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U.S. has recognized the potential for conflict, and has cau-
tioned the private sector that if self-regulation does not
work,15 "the Administration will face increasing pressure to
play a more direct role."16 Accordingly, the U.S. has indi-
cated it will continue discussions with the E.U. "to increase
understanding about the U.S. approach to privacy and to as-
sure that the criteria [the E.U. uses] for evaluating adequacy
are sufficiently flexible to accommodate our approach."1
In the meantime, however, the governments have agreed
upon "Safe Harbor Principles" to permit the free flow of data
between the E.U. and U.S. without requiring U.S. entities to
actually conform with the Directive's standard for protec-
tion.'62 The compromise upholds the United States' reliance
May 25, 2000, at http://www.thestandard.com/articledisplay/0,1151,15439,00.html. In
fact, Forrester Research has predicted that Congress will pass "weak" legislation in
2001, and then drop the issue until 2005. Id.
159. See FTC REPORT, supra note 136. The report concluded that private sector
self-regulation has 'fallen far short of what is needed to protect consumers." Id. at
iii. With the exception of very specific legislation, such as the Children's Online
Privacy Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 6501, the U.S. government has done little to protect
privacy online. Even the courts have balked at affording such protections. See
Smyth v. Pillsbury, 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The court upheld the firing
of an employee after she complained that the company refused to adhere to its
promises of confidentiality in employee e-mail. The court held employees do not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail communications. Id.
160. FRAMEWORK, supra note 154, at 12. The United State's reliance upon in-
dustry self-regulation is likely politically motivated, as well as being based upon
First Amendment ideals. Private industry has loudly championed a self-regulatory
model and would obviously benefit from the opportunity to establish the
protections-on behalf of consumers-to which it would have to adhere, without
government intervention. The Administration's warning that it "will face increasing
pressure to play a more direct role" is clearly a less-than-veiled incentive for in-
dustry to take appropriate measures. See FTC REPORT, supra note 136.
Not surprisingly, "American firms view the EU [Dlirective as Draconian and
unworkable, and object to the EU's ban on the export of data to countries with
less-strict regulations because this threatens to erect a huge barrier to the transat-
lantic transmission of information." Living in the global goldfish bowl, THE ECONO-
MIST, Dec. 18, 1999, at 49. However, a holiday study by the Electronic Privacy
Information Center ("EPIC"), of the 100 most popular online shopping sites deter-
mined that none met the "basic criteria for privacy protection" in conformance
with fair information practices. The executive director of EPIC concluded that 'self
regulation has failed. 'We need legislation to enforce fair information practices.'"
John Schwartz, Internet Privacy Eroding Study Says, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 1999,
at E4.
161. FRAMEWORK, supra note 154, at 12.
162. "Commerce Secretary William M. Daley Hails U.S.-EU "Safe Harbor" Pri-
vacy Arrangement," Commerce News, U.S. Dept. of Commerce (March 14, 2000), at
http'//www.ita.doc.gov/media/privacy314.html. Beyond privacy concerns, the compro-
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upon self-regulation permitting companies to elect entrance
into the harbor via self-certification.163 After two-years of ne-
gotiations, the resulting Principles recognize the fundamental
differences in the respective approaches to privacy protec-
tion."6
The European Union and the United States are each rely-
ing on their own unique approach to achieve the aforemen-
tioned balance.'65 With proactive regulation, however, the
E.U.'s approach causes significant effects on third coun-
tries.'66 By contrast, a self-regulatory scheme within the pri-
vate sector does not represent a unilateral effort by one entity,
intentional or otherwise, to influence activity or dictate policy
mise serves to resolve significant economic and political dissonance as the
Agreement protects $350 billion in E.U.-U.S. trade. See European Union OKs 'Safe
Harbor', Jason Spingarn-Koff, WIRED, May 31, 2000. However, consternation re-
mains on both sides of the issue, and the Atlantic, as privacy advocates ridicule
the pact as "toothless" and business interests claim it "in effect establishes a non-
tariff trade barrier." U.S., E.U. data privacy deal near, CNET News, June 4, 2000,
at http'//news.cnet.com/newsO-1005-202-2016754.html; U.S., EU Agree on Privacy
Standard, Robert O'Harrow Jr., WASH. POST, June 1, 2000, at E4.
163. SAFE HARBOR PRIVACY PRINCIPLES, issued by the U.S. Department of
Commerce, at http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/ecomfUSPrinciplesJune2000.htm (last visited
June 24, 2000); Opinion 4/2000 on the level of protection provided by the "Safe
Harbor Principles," adopted May 16, 2000, E.U. Media, Information Society and
Data Protection, at http'//europa.eu.int/comninternal_market/en/media/data-
prot/wpdocs/wp32en.htm (last visited June 25, 2000).
164. SAFE HARBOR PRIVACY PRINCIPLES, issued by the U.S. Department of Com-
merce, at http//www.ita.doc.gov/td/ecom/USPrinciplesJune2000.htm (last visited
June 24, 2000). "While the United States and European Union share the goal of
enhancing privacy protection for their citizens, the United States takes a different
approach to privacy from that taken by the European Community." Id.
165. The most apparent example of this difference is the E.U.'s treatment of
privacy as a fundamental right, whereas the U.S. has no uniform privacy legis-
lation. See Perritt and Stewart, supra note 66; See also N.Y. L.J., supra note 81,
at 3 ("The U.S. does not have equivalent federal privacy statutes for privacy pro-
tection.").
In fact, in searching for a right to privacy within the U.S. Constitution,
Justice Douglas was forced to look to the penumbras of certain amendments now
made famous in his majority opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), since no prima facie right was found to exist. The Court has proceeded to
recognize a constitutional interest "in avoiding disclosures of personal matters" in
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977), but that protection has never been test-
ed against legislative action. Of course, such a Constitutional protection only would
apply to the government's use of personal information, and not that of the private
sector. Compare with Human Rights Convention, supra note 96, and the Treaty of
the E.U. For a good discussion of the different regulatory approaches taken by the
E.U. and the U.S., see SWIRE, supra note 2.
166. See supra Section II.A.
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over another sovereign entity. The E.U. is recognizing and
addressing a profound concern among the Internet communi-
ty.'67 Perhaps due to its appreciation of privacy as a funda-
mental right,168 and its greater willingness to rely on govern-
ment regulation,'69 the E.U. has elected to take such a sub-
stantial step.
The appropriateness of its actions, however, is irrelevant
within the context of this discussion. The salient point is that
the E.U. is unable, due to the nature of the Internet, to act
within its own sovereign interests without extraterritorial
effect. Regardless of the European Union's motivations, there
is no denying that the effect of the Directive transcends sover-
eign borders. By unilaterally establishing the standard for
protection, the E.U. has unquestionably "intervene[d] in the
internal or external affairs of"7 third countries. These sover-
eign states must either comply with the will of a foreign power,
or be effectively sanctioned via a blacklist. 7 ' Because the
Internet transcends borders, the Directive, to be effective, must
as well.
V. SOVEREIGNTY AND THE INTERNET
A. Trouble Ahead, Trouble Behind
What does the Internet do to traditional notions of sover-
eignty when states are faced with the unavoidable reality that
most any regulation of the technology will necessarily impact
upon other sovereign states in violation of international law?
167. See A Little Privacy Please, supra note 140. Poll found 78% of Internet
users claim they "would use the Web more if privacy were guaranteed." See also
Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy, supra note 156, at 1609 ("Indeed, information
privacy concerns are the leading reason why individuals not on the Internet are
choosing to stay off."); SWIRE, supra note 2, at 80.
"A study by the Center for Democracy and Technology found that less than
10 percent of all Web sites respected the O.E.C.D.'s privacy guidelines, which
stipulate that people have the right to expect that any personal data they submit
over the Internet will not be used without their consent, that they have a right to
correct any errors and to assume the data will be protected from abuse."
Friedman, supra note 135. See also Cate, Data Protection Law, supra note 1, at
441.
168. See supra Section II.B.
169. See SWIRE, supra note 2, at 159.
170. See supra Section I.
171. See Directive, supra note 6, at art. 25, para. 4.
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The European Union is acting pursuant to its ideological be-
liefs and in a genuine effort to protect the interests of its citi-
zenry.'72 However, by doing so, it affronts certain maxims of
international law leading to conflict with other states.
New regulatory endeavors are on the horizon, akin to the
Directive.7 ' These include efforts to govern contract,7 4 law
enforcement and encryption,'75  digital signatures, 7 '
consumer protection and spamming,177 and intellectual
property.'78 These ventures are likely to result in dissension
regarding their appropriateness, necessity, applicability and
impact, as each attempts to harness the power of the Internet
according to the regulating state's own self-interest.' There
can be little doubt that other Internet regulatory efforts will
have the same effect."80 While in the instance of the Directive
two basic principles are in conflict-the protection of privacy
172. Interestingly, however, the effectiveness of the Directive is quite question-
able. The Economist commissioned a private investigator to retrieve information
about the article's author, based in the U.K. Perhaps not surprisingly, the investi-
gator easily obtained "protected" personal information, in contravention of U.K.
privacy laws passed in accordance with the Directive. Living in the global goldfish
bowl, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 1999, at 49.
173. See Owen, supra note 40.
174. See The European Commission's proposal for a Directive on certain legal
aspects of electronic commerce in the on-line market, O.J. (C 139) (June 16, 1999);
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Model Law
on Electronic Commerce, Dec. 16, 1996; Building Confidence in Electronic Com-
merce - a consultation document published by the U.K. Dept. of Trade and Indus-
try. See generally David Mirchin, Online Contracts, 563 PLI/Pat 351 (1999); Owen,
supra note 40, at 266 ("There is a growing realisation that there is little point in
any one country (or even one trading block) announcing e-commerce legislation if
this is not also extended to its major trading partners.").
175. See Fact Sheet on Cyberspace Electronic Security Act of 1999 ("CESA"), at
http./www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1999/9/16/16.text.1
(last visited Jan. 8, 2000).
176. See The European Commission's proposal for a Directive on a Common
Framework for Digital Signatures, O.J. (C 325) (Oct. 23, 1998).
177. See The European Distance Selling Directive, 97/7 O.J. 97/L144, May 20,
1997.
178. See The European Copyright Directive Proposal, O.J. 98/C/108/03; The
European Trade Mark Directive, 89/104 O.J. 88 L/40, Dec. 21, 1998.
179. See, e.g., Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 937 ("No nation is under an unre-
mitting obligation to enforce foreign interests which are fundamentally prejudicial
to those of the domestic forum. Thus, from the earliest times, authorities have
recognized that the obligation of comity expires when the strong public policies of
the forum are vitiated by the foreign act.").
180. See Owen, supra note 40.
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and the free flow of information 81-other efforts may result in
the promotion of numerous antagonistic ideals each advocated
by a sovereign state interest. The resulting panoply of conflict-
ing laws is not likely to further the technology's evolution or
serve to benefit its users.
B. International Agreements
In the future, Internet regulation may require internation-
al arrangements that transcend state borders and originate
independent of traditional state governmental processes. These
international conventions would be free from the tarnish of
unilateral state action and would prevent acceding sovereign
states from encroaching upon each other's sovereignty in viola-
tion of the principles of international law. States "must recog-
nize that, because of the global characteristic of information
and its centrality to the modern economy, their own self-inter-
est lies in compatible legal regimes, workable international
standards, and global cooperation."" 2
The mechanisms for the imposition for such international
standards are varied. Some commentators suggest creating a
distinct cyberlaw jurisdiction-separate from territorial spheres
of law-based on established Internet rules and protocols.'83
These proponents argue that "by applying both the doctrine of
comity and the idea of delegation to Cyberspace, a local sover-
eign is called upon to defer to self-regulatory judgments of a
population partly, but not wholly, composed of its own sub-
jects."184  Others analogize the problems of regulating
Cyberspace to those faced by sovereign states attempting to
regulate the high seas, which, like the Internet, are located
beyond a state's territorial reach'85 and are governed by in-
181. See supra Section IV.B.
182. Cate, The Globalization of Law, supra note 2, at 487.
183. See Johnson and Post, supra note 2. See also John Perry Barlow, A Dec-
laration of the Independence of Cyberspace, at
http://www.eff.org/pub/Publications/John_PerryBarlow/barlow_0296.declaration (last
visited Oct. 23, 2000) (Proclaiming, "Governments of the Industrial World, you
weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of the
Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are
not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.").
184. Johnson and Post, supra note 2, at 1367.
185. See Matthew R. Burnstein, Conflicts on the Net: Choice of Law in Trans-
national Cyberspace, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 103-104 (1996).
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ternational convention.'86 Accordingly, they propose applying
principles of admiralty law to control online activity.'87
Choice of law decisions would be made depending upon the
type of interaction between the various parties.188 A third
methodology recommends "conditioning access [to the Internet]
on consent to a governing legal regime ... at the entry point of
a cyberspace network."8 9  By doing so, traditional,
territorially based rules then could be readily applied."'
The imposition of one of these, or any other, governing
regime first would require an international agreement to en-
sure acceding states universally conform to its application. A
state's ability to regulate the Internet then would be dictated
by the provisions of that agreement and conflicts of law would
be resolved accordingly.' 9'
C. Individual Self-Regulation and the Internet Community
Another regulatory methodology could depend upon self-
regulation. However, rather then relying upon traditional in-
dustry self-regulation, this model would rely upon individual
self-regulation. The plurality of norms, ideas, customs, and
politics within the Internet community itself escapes regulation
by a single entity or acquiescence to a single jurisdiction. For
example, at the heart of the European Union's Directive is a
principled belief system stemming from a communal ideology
regarding the protection of personal information."12 The
Internet represents an infinite number of ideologies and indi-
186. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.
Doc. AJCONF.62.122.
187. See Burnstein, supra note 182, at 103-104.
188. See id. at 103-104. Specifically, three types of interaction are delineated:
"(1) disputes involving parties in privity with each other who act in their
cyberspatial capacities; (2) those involving two users not in privity but acting in
their cyberspatial capacities; and, (3) those involving cyberspace with regard to the
defendant, but not the plaintiff." Id. at 116.
189. Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1213-
1217 (1998) (Concluding "that the governing law challenges presented by
cyberspace are not significantly different from the ones presented by other trans-
national transactions.").
190. See id.
191. See generally Burnstein, supra note 182, at 103-104; Kai Schadbach, The
Benefits of Comparative Law: A Continental European View, 16 B.U. INT'L L.J. 331
(1998).
192. See supra Section III.A.
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viduals congregating around them. These individuals are also
not delineated by geographic boundaries and are further re-
moved from real space through their online activity.'93 Appro-
priately then, the enforcement of a single state's self-interested
policies will inevitably run afoul of one or many within the
Internet community.'94 Even negotiated international agree-
ments necessarily would have to benefit certain ideals while
forsaking others in an effort to achieve compromise and unity.
The encroachment is no longer upon another state's sovereign-
ty, but an infringement upon the sovereignty of the individual.
The sovereignty of the individual predates the sovereignty
of nation-states,19 which did not truly become an axiom of
international law until the seventeenth century.196 Perhaps
the Internet represents, in some capacity, a return to a state of
nature in which humans interact with each other out of their
own self-interest'97 and out of the reach of a common govern-
mental power.' However, even in the state of nature, norms
develop.'99 Individuals seek to protect their own self-interest
in relation to one another and a system of reciprocity
evolves-communities develop. °0
193. See generally Cate, Data Protection Law, supra note 1, at 441; Cate, The
Globalization of Law, supra note 2.
194. See supra Section IV.B.3.
195. See JANIS, supra note 15, at ch. 6.
196. Id.
197. See HOBBES, supra note 19.
198. See id. See also Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, Discourse on the Origin of In-
equality (1754) (trs. by Donald. A. Cress in BASIC POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JEAN-
JACQUES ROUSSEAU 1987). Rousseau argued that the ills of the human condition
result from the formation of society and that in the state of nature humans are
free and happy "noble savages." In a famous passage Rousseau criticizes the civil
society declaring, "Itihe first man who enclosed a plot of ground and thought of
saying, 'This is mine,' and found others stupid enough to believe him, was the
true founder of civil society." Id. at 60.
199. See J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1861). Mill's exegesis on the happiness
principle argues that "the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is
desirable is that people do actually desire it" and that, as a matter of fact, happi-
ness is the one and only thing people desire.
For further exposition on norms supplementing (if not supplanting) public
law on the Internet, see David G. Post & David R. Johnson, Chaos Prevailing on
Every Continent: Towards a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Com-
plex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1055 (1998); Johnson and Post, supra note 2.
200. See MILL, ON LIBERTY (1848). Mill mitigates the happiness principle with
the harm principle arguing that an individual's ability to act is limited at the
point at which she causes harm to another. "In support of this principle, Mill cited
the varied benefits of liberty in self-regarding actions. Such liberty, he argued,
2000]
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The early stages of the Internet mirrored this condi-
tion.2°' Individuals acted not only for their own purposes, but
also to develop and promote the technology.' The earliest
uses of the Internet included the creation of online communi-
ties which established rules through consensus, trial and er-
ror. 20 These communities then provided support, guidance,
instruction, information, and other collective benefits to their
membership. °4
Further, these online communities may, in fact, be better
suited to enforce developed norms than governments are able
to develop and enforce law. For example, an entity in one state
who violates the laws of another may be easily spared the
enforcing will of the regulating state if it is unable to force
extradition or otherwise impose a sanction."°5 By contrast,
leads to the discovery of useful new truths and modes of life; confirms and
strengthens the insights we already possess; and promotes the happiness of each
individual more surely than any enforced and uniform standard can." CLASSICS OF
WESTERN PHILOSOPHY, 3RD ed. (Steven M. Cahn ed., Hackett Publishing Co., Inc.
1977) (emphasis added). See also Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v.
Associated Press: Custom and Law as Sources of Property in News, 78 VA. L. REV.
85, 126 (1992) (Suggesting that norms should be enforced only when "there are
repeat and reciprocal interactions between the same parties.").
201. See JOHN SEABROOK, DEEPER: ADVENTURES ON THE NET (1997); HOWARD
RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY, at http:J/www.rheingold.com/vc/book/ (last
visited Nov. 17, 1999).
202. See SEABROOK, supra note 198; RHEINGOLD, supra note 198.
203. See SEABROOK, supra note 198. An example of one of the first online com-
munities is The WELL, a Bay Area based network which early on developed its
own rules and protocols for membership and use. Seabrook explains that "[the
basic idea was that by providing citizens with the technology to do more things
for themselves . . .you could free people from their dependence on mass consumer
products and corporate marketing, which were the windows through which the
soul leaked out of modern man." Id. at 147-148.
204. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 198. In fact, Internet communities have since
become the subject of college lectures, Internet Communities, at
http-//www.westga.edu/-dboldt/BUSA1900/F/TopicF.html (last visited Nov. 17, 1999);
and Building Communities on the Internet, at http:/www.syslab.ceu.hu/
-i-netcl/(last visited Nov. 17, 1999), and generated the creation of Web newsletters,
Community Report, at http'/www.OnlineCommunityReport.com (last visited Nov.
17, 1999).
205. See Legislation threatens European e-commerce: Irish companies hoping to
trade online to the world may face complex legal battles if new EU draft legislation
comes into play, John Kennedy, Bus. & FIN. WORLD REPT., Sept. 23, 1999 (Criti-
cizing new, proposed legislation which would permit a lawsuit to be filed in the
jurisdiction in which the buyer of sales and goods is located. "The prospect of
having to defend cases in a foreign court could deter some businesses from making
the most of e-commerce . .. IThe E.U.] has to let the market decide. It would be
impossible to investigate every single item sold on the Internet.").
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the Internet's history is replete with instances wherein mem-
bers of the online community acted to enforce community
norms by punishing or "flaming" violators.0 6
Norms need not supplant current law governing Internet
activity which similarly takes place offline. °7 The concern is
for new law, crafted specifically to control the Internet, which
threatens to encroach upon its continued evolution and violate
established norms which have well served to govern those
areas law does not control. Norms do not risk encroachment
upon state sovereignty and serve to promote the
communitarian nature of the Internet. In short, norms should
govern where the law cannot.08
Therefore, while the priaciple of sovereignty as currently
existent within the international legal regime is inapplicable to
cyberspace due to competing ideologies advanced by singular,
self-interested states, it nevertheless remains intact in its
truer, original form, empowering the individual.29 Norms
and rules will evolve pursuant to the needs of the individuals
206. For example, spamming, or the sending of bulk, unsolicited e-mail, has
long engaged the wrath of members of the Internet community. In response, mem-
bers have united to boycott spammers, BlackMail, at http:llwww.bitgate.com/spam
(last visited on Nov. 17, 1999), and educate each other concerning the threat of
spare, how to avoid it, and fight back, Fight Spain on the Internet!, at
http://www.spam.abuse.netspam (last visited Nov. 17, 1999). Perhaps the most
comprehensive source to combat spain is a twelve part C-NET story instructing
users on all aspects of avoiding and combating spare. Can anyone stop SPAM?, at
http://www.cnet.com/ContentlFeatures/Howto/Stop/ssola.html (last visited Oct. 23,
2000). All are freely available and signify a communal effort to protect a norm
and punish transgressors.
207. See Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 1257 (1998)("[T]here are three possible types of actors who might
enforce Internet norms: self-appointed private individuals who determine the norms
and enforce them, usually by excluding offenders from the Net altogether; judges
deferring to norms in the particular cases in which the issues arise; or the archi-
tecture of the Internet itself, which might simply make certain types of conduct
impossible."). Id. at 1292.
208. See also Richard A. Epstein, supra note 200, at 126. Epstein suggests that
"decentralized customs may be generated without legal interference and control,
but legal force may be necessary to maintain them against systematic defection."
Id.
209. Howe, Supreme Court, 1952 Term-Foreward: Political Theory and the Na-
ture of Liberty, HARV. L. REV. 91, (1953). "[Glovernment must recognize that it is
not the sole possessor of sovereignty, and that private groups within the communi-
ty are entitled to lead their own free lives and exercise within the area of their
competence an authority so effective as to justify labeling it a sovereign authority."
Id.
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comprising the Internet community21 ° distinct from any in-
terference from real space governmental mechanisms which
cannot translate to effectively control certain aspects of a non-
territorially based technology.
2
"
VI. CONCLUSION
This note illustrates the failure of governments in their
effort to regulate the Internet, specifically due to an adherence
to conventional regulatory paradigms. The principles of real
space do not always translate to cyberspace. The inherent
degree to which states infringe upon other state's sovereignty
in attempting to regulate the Internet, in violation of interna-
tional law, is highlighted by the European Union's Directive.
Accordingly, future regulatory efforts, in order to conform with
the principles of international law and prevent conflicts among
states, should depend upon international agreements or rely
upon individual self-regulation toward the continued evolution
of the Internet community.
Joshua S. Bauchner'
210. The sense of "community" on the Internet is quite strong. Historically,
individuals have been willing to sacrifice their sovereignty for the benefit of com-
munity membership. The community then provides a degree of security and identi-
ty to the individual, perhaps unattainable alone in the state of nature. For exam-
ple, in the Crito, Socrates refused to forsake the community of Athens, even to
escape his own death. Socrates realized that part of his identity was shaped by
Athens and he was no longer only a separate individual, but also, and more im-
portantly, part of something larger.
Similarly, members of the Internet community have conformed to certain
community ideals and now represent themselves accordingly. Encroachment upon
that community, as much as an encroachment upon their individuality, is met
with significant resistance. See SEABROOK, supra note 201; RHEINGOLD, supra note
198.
211. See supra Section IV.
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